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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK F. SCHERBEL, 
Plaintiff~AppelIant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
et al., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
ERIFF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 19633 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This case presents the following issues: 
1. May this Court seriously entertain appellant-Scherbel's 
Statement of Facts when: (a) there are no references to the 
official record, and (b) there are significant inaccuracites, 
mischaracterizations and significant omissions? 
2. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it 
applied Western Land Equities v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 
(1980) to preclude appellant-Scherbelfs assertion of vested 
rights to avoid the application of new City zoning changes? 
3. Does the record support the trial court's findings that 
appellant-Scherbel: 
(a) Knew his property was in an historic district,-, 
reauiring design review under a strict scrutiny test; 
(b) Knew of a movement to submit to the City a 
petition for a change in zoning in the subject area to more 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
restrictive terms ("R-2H") was pending and chances of its 
success were high; 
(c) Presented a development plan which included a 
critical parcel of ground which appellant-Scherbel did not 
own nor control; 
(d) Proposed at least 3 plans, each of which failed to 
conform to the prior existing "F-6" zoning, let alone the 
more restrictive "R-~2Hn zoninq; 
(e) Proposed plans which were visually incompatible in 
the Avenues Historic District (by the City Council). 
4. Does the record support the trial court's finding that, 
prior to the adoption of the new ffR-2H" zoning provisions, 
appellant-Scherbel had not substantially complied with the then 
existing "R-6" zoning provisions; and that therefore, Scherbel 
was not unlawfully denied a building permit by the City? 
5. Did the Court commit prejudicial error when it ruled 
that the Greater Avenues Community Council ("GACC") had standing 
to challenge a decision on Historical Design Compatability Review 
required under City law? 
6. Did the lower court commit prejudicial error when it 
ruled that the City Council could hear appeals on Design Review 
from the City's Planninq Commission, when said procedure was 
established under City law and with the concurrence of the Mayor? 
7. Was the City Council's decision arbitrary or capricious 
when it denied appellant-Scherbel's appeal from the Planninq 
-2-
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Commission's Design Review decision? 
DETEPMINATIVE LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
Chapter 32 of Title 51 of Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CAPE 
In this zoning case, plaintiff-appellant, Jack F. Scherbel, 
sought to build an income producing structure in the Avenues 
Historic District. A modified design was approved, but 
appellant-Scherbel claims he had vested rights to a larger 
development. Similarly, Scherbel desires to have the City 
Council's decision finding his project visually incompatible in 
the Historic District invalidated for alleged procedural 
improprieties. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On February 25, 1980, appellant-Scherbel obtained a 
restraining order barring defendant-respondent, Salt Lake City 
Corporation from proceeding with the publication of two 
ordinances scheduled to run February 26, 1980. One of the 
ordinances established a new district, the Residential nR-2n 
District. The second changed the then existing Residential "R-6" 
to the lower density, more restrictive Residential "R-2H11 
classification, for a large area known as the East Avenues area 
of the City. That order was dissolved and the reauest for 
injunctive relief denied by Court Order on or about March 24, 
1980. 
-3-
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After a bench trial, the lower court dismissed Scherbel's 
complaint for extraordinary relief. A copy of said Judgment is 
attached with a copy of the Second Amended Findings of ^acts as • 
Appendix Exhibit 1 and 2. 
The lower court dismissed Scherbel's complaint concludinq: 
(1) The decision of the City Council denying conceptual 
approval of Scherbel's proposed project1 by the City's Planninq 
Commission was affirmed; the Court ruled it was not arbitrary 
and did it exceed the City Council's authority. 
(2) The development standards of the City's Historic 
District Design Review System are constitutional; 
(3) The "R-2H" zoning provisions are constitutional. These 
ordinance provisions include an appeal right from the Plannina 
Commission to the City Council. 
(4) The legislative act of downzoning land to ,fR-2H" was 
not invalid. 
(5) Scherbel was not entitled to a buildinq permit and has 
Scherbel submitted to the City various plans for the property at 
different times suggesting four different buildings designs. The 
distinctions are most easily described in terms of heioht and 
number of units, as follows: (a) Exhibit 37P submitted to HLC 
10/24/81 is for 35 units at 75 feet in height. (b) Exhibit 38P 
were updated concepts reflected in Exhibit 39, which was prepared 
for the appeal to the Plannina Commission showinq 32 units 65 
feet in height (R 358, 421-22, 429). (c) Exhibit 43 shows 24 
units. (d) Exhibit 43 is alternate plan for 18 units. 
2The comparative profiles of the structure in both 37P (35 units) 
to 39P (32 units) is illustrated well on Exhibits 55 and 56 which 
are attached as Exhibits 3 and 4 to the Appendix. 
-4-
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no vested r i g h t s for any of his proposed p r o j e c t s . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The City as on appeal seeks an order from the Supreme Court 
affirming the judgment of the Lov/er Court and awarding its costs 
and fees herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS K 
Because the complicated chronology of this case, the trial 
court (after more than one hearing) entered detailed Findings of 
Facts. Those Findings are attached as Appendix, Exhibit 2. 
However, because of the numerous inaccuracies in the allegations 
made in the appellant-Scherbel's brief and its failure to cite 
the record, The City believes it should be stricken. A few of 
the errors shall be noted. 
1. Contrary to the appellant's brief, Scherbel was not the 
owner of property on the southeast corner of "E" Street and 
Second Avenue. This parcel, while included in the project, was 
owned by a Mr. Bennett. As of trial, there had been no written 
agreement, merely an agreement to agree (R 248). There had been 
no disclosure of that fact by appellant-Scherbel at the time the 
projects were submitted to the City for review. (Testimony of 
Mark Hafey; R 532-534). Of the other three parcels, there is no 
testimony cited in the record on appeal that can substantiate the 
See footnote 1 above. 
See Finding No. 2. 
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individualized history of each parcel proffered by Mr. 
Scherbel. Mr. Scherbel and Mr. Bennett testified at trial, but 
their testimony was not ordered by the appellant and is thus, not 
before this Court for appropriate reference by appellant or 
rebuttal by the City. 
2. In addition, as to the statements relatinq to attempts 
of Scherbel to develop portions of the property controlled by 
himself or his family, Scherbel cites to Exhibits "D 28-32" which 
were documents rejected by the trial judge (R 229). They are not 
properly before this Court; however, appellant-Scherbel having 
raised the issue, a more relevant fact should be noted: there 
were several proposals by appellant-Scherbel in the 3 vears 
between 1973 and 1976 (R 229). They demonstrated a pattern of 
speculative proposals that each reauired a City zoning variance 
or action by the City's Board of Adjustment; each of these plans 
came to naught, without action by the City. (D Ex. 28, 29, 30, 
31, 32). 
3. Scherbel has understandably but inaccurately taken a 
broad brush approach to the chronology of events. The accurate 
chronology is detailed in Findings No. 4-40 (R 355-362). A 
highlight of the dynamic factors are Fact Nos. 4-39, below. 
4. As part of its process for developing an updated master 
5(R 224) 
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plan for the Avenues Community, in 19 75 the City undertook 
identification of citizen goals and objectives for the 
Avenues. Goals identified, in that process included (a) the 
establishment of historical districts; (b) changesdn zoning to 
lower densities', to discourage speculation, encouraae 
preservation and new compatible development; and (c) protection 
of the foothills. Participants of that process included the 
GACC. Following the development of the Master Plan, GACC has 
been active in seeking the legislative changes needed to address 
and implement those goals. (R 245). 
5. The Greater Avenues Community Council is a non-profit 
corporation of the State of Utah, Its declared purpose is to 
promote the general well being of the residents of the Avenues 
area of Salt Lake City. Its members are appointed or elected 
residents of the Avenues. (R 245 -% Articles and Bylaws R 284-
292). One of its purposes is to affiliate with the Salt Lake 
Association of Community Councils (R 287). 
6. In April of 1976, Salt Lake City Corporation established 
an Historical District and Landmark's Sites ordinance for the 
South Temple District. (Section 51-32-1, et seq., Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended). A second 
district for the Avenues, initiated in 1977, became formally 
A community within the City identified as the area existing 
north of North Temple and south of Capitol Hill. 
'Avenues Goals and Policy Report, Exhibits 48 D and 49 D (R 229). 
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established in 1978. Anpellant-Scherbel's property lies within 
the boundaries of the Avenues Historic District subject of these 
ordinances. (R 245, 355-6). 
7. Pursuant to Chapter 3 2 of the ahove referenced City 
ordinances, all proposals for demolition or construction within 
an Historical District must include an apnlication for design 
review and are to be evaluated by the Historical Landmarks 
Committee, ("HLC") for visual compatibility with existino* 
structures, in light of established development standards. HLC's 
decision is forwarded as a recommendation to the City's Planning 
Commission. The Planning Commission then evaluates the 
application in light of HLC's recommendation. Usually it is 
given approval as a consent matter, unless an appeal is filed. 
If an appeal is filed with the Commission, it undertakes its own 
review and either denies or grants conceptual approval of the 
schematic design. If conceptual approval is granted by the 
Commission, the proposed project is then processed by City 
administrative departments in the same manner as all other 
projects, once working drawings and an application for a buildina 
o 
permit are filed. That is, the City then reviews the documents 
to determine whether the project meets design approval and 
In the form of Exhibit 41D required by Sections 301 and 302 of 
the Uniform Building Code, Exhibit 93D as adopted by Section 51-
7-2 of City's ordinances, Exhibit 92D, and the provisions of 
Chapter 5 of Title 5, Exhibit 91A, and Section 51-4-4, Exhibit 
90D. 
-8-
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complies with other City zoning ordinances and building code 
Q . 
requirements. Unless an affected party disagrees with the 
Planning Commission decision and timely appeals to the City 
Council, the Planning Commission's decision is final. (R 512, 
524, 537-547). I i 
8. Plaintiff was acauainted with the design review process 
of the historic district, after submitting to HLC an application 
in July of 1977 for desiqn review to construct a convalescent 
center on his property. (R 356, 434). 
9. In November of 1978, following on the heels of a citizen 
initiated and GACC supported petitioit to change the zoning of the 
West Avenues area (West of ,fE* Street), property owners and t,? 
residents of the East Central^Avenues publicly began a project to 
downzone the eastern portion of the Avenues. (R 356). 
10. The aforesaid rezoning project requested downzoning; it 
also sought the creation of a new residential district. These
 : 
legislative initiatives sought to preserve the unique historical 
character of the lower East-Central Avenues and to protect -
The building official is prohibited from issuing buildinq 
permits, until compliance with zoning codes is ascertained as -
required by Section 51-4-2, (Exhibit 90D), 51-32-4, and the 
Planning Commission is prohibited in Section 51-32-7 from
 : 
granting approval beyond concept unless the proposal meets all 
other requirements for "issuance of such a permit". (R 537-547). 
Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Exhibit 25P. 
11HLC Case No. 24 of 1977, Exhibit 33D 
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aga ins t speculat ion pressures for incompatible development. 
1 1 . The change of the zoning was discussed with the C i t y ' s 
Planning Department in January of 19 79. I t was formally 
presented to HLC in March of 1979 and reduced to formal wri t ten 
proposal , with supporting s ignatures to the City on July 5, 1979 
as P e t i t i o n No. 579 of 1979. (R 356). 
12. After reviewing the p e t i t i o n on i t s own, on September 
13, 1979, the Commission scheduled an informal publ ic hearing for 
October 11, 1979; however, due to con f l i c t s the meeting was 
rescheduled to October 25, 1979. (R 357). 
13. Appellant-Scherbel became aware of the downzoninq 
p ro jec t for the East-Central Avenues a t or about January, 1979, 
when the West Avenues were downzoned. (R 433A). 
14. Mr. Babcock, appe l lan t -Scherbe l ' s a r c h i t e c t had been 
involved with a pro jec t in the Avenues Hi s to r i ca l D i s t r i c t and 
was aware of the e f fo r t s and object ives to proceed with 
downzoning the Avenues. (R 438, 433A, 431). 
15. In Spring of 1979 (when appel lant-Scherbel employed 
architect-Babcock to design a condominium pro jec t allowable under 
maximum lfR-6" zoning p o t e n t i a l ) , both were aware of pending 
proposals to secure downzoning of the East-Central Avenues, which 
would include Mr. Scherbel ' s property . (R 410, 433, 433A, 356, 
438). 
16. In August of 1979, architect-Babcock informally 
contacted HLC's chairperson to identify and a n t i c i p a t e possible 
- 1 0 -
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HLC concerns for such a project. Among other things, the pending 
zoning changes were discussed. (R 416, 356). 
17. After a preliminary informal meeting with PLC's 
architectural subcommittee on September"14, 1979, on October 24, 
1979 Mr. Babcock prepared and appellant-Scherbel submitted to the 
City partial schematic or conceptual drawings of a 35-unit 
multiple family dwelling 75' high with an application form signed 
by the plaintiff, as owner of the property within the proposed 
project. (R 444-6; Exhibit 2P, R 357). 
18. The "design review" is the initial preliminary stage 
where concepts are reflected on partial schematic drawings; they 
are submitted to minimize unnecessary expense, work and delay to 
the property owner. These designs are the forerunner, but are 
not a substitute for subsequent working drawings which must be 
prepared prior to a developers application for and the City's 
issuance of a building permit. (R 447-450, 538-544, 489-494)..
 ;. 
19. The Planning Commission conducted the hearing on the 
above described rezoning petition for the Avenues, which 
appellant-Scherbel attended. On November 8, it formally 
recommended forwarding the Commission's approval of the 
downzoning petition and adoption of a "R-2H" district for the 
area. On November 21, 1979, the recommendation was referred to 
the then City Commission.12 (R 357). 
,zln May of 1979, City residents voted to change an optional 
Mayor-Council form of government. The Council members and Mayor 
(footnote continued) 
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20. HLC first considered plaintiff's drawings on November 
6, 1979. On December 4, 1979, after negative recommendation from 
its architectural subcommittee, HLC determined the proposed 75' 
high 35-unit project was not visually compatible with the 
buildings to which it was visually related in the district. 
Denial was due to violation of the development standards 
pertaining to height and scale, sometimes called "density" or 
"mass". (R 358, 420). 
21. On December 6, 1979, plaintiff appealed the adverse 
recommendation of HLC to the Planning Commission. This hearing 
was scheduled on December 13, 1979 for hearing on January 10, 
1980. (R 358). 
22. In anticipation of the appeal hearing before the 
Planning Commission, architect-Babcock prepared preliminary 
drawings for appellant-Scherbel's second project, a 65' high 32-
unit building. (R 358, Exhibit 38). 
23. This second design concept in Exhibit 38P was revised 
prior to the hearing; on January 10, 1980 it was presented in the 
amended form of a 32-unit project (Exhibit 39P). These schematic 
and partial drawings for the 32-unit project were presented 
directly to the Planning Commission, without HLC review. This 
latest project was given design compatibility concept approval by 
were elected in early November of 1979. The Mayor was the only 
person elected to continue in office. (R 358). 
13Exhibit 37P. 
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the'--'Commission. (R 475, 358). 
24. On January 11, 1980f GACC appealed the decision of the 
Planning Commission to the Mayor, an option provided by City 
Ordinance Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 1965, as amended. (R 359)* 
25. Early in January, 1980, the City Council advertised the 
hearing to consider rezoning proposals of petition 579 for 
January 29, 1980. (R 109). The hearinq was continued to January 
31, 1980, after which the Council gave conceptual approval and 
reauested the ordinance be prepared in appropriate legislative 
form. (R 359). 
26." The legislation was prepared and passed on February 19, 
1980. It was scheduled for publication on February 26, 1980. (R 
104-114). 
27. On January 29, 1980, the Salt Lake City Attorney's 
office provided Mayor Ted Wilson and the City Council, with an 
opinion letter regarding the procedure for hearing GACC's 
appeal. (R 359). — . 
28. On February 4, 1980, the City Council gave notice to 
the Appellant-Scherbel that it would hear the GACC appeal of the 
Planning Commission decision on the HLC case February 19, 1980. 
(R 359). 
29. On February 5, 1980, architect-Pabcock presented his , 
second 32-unit project of Exhibit 39 (approved by the Planning 
Commission) to HLC, which found it to be incompatible for the 
-13-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
same problems associated with the original 35-unit project. 
(R 359; cf. Statement of Fact No. 20, above). 
30. On February 19, 1980, the Mayor issued Executive Order 
No. 2, which designated the City Council as the proper body to 
hear the appeal.14 (R 359; cf. Statement of Fact Nos. 24 and 27, 
above). 
31. On February 19 and 20, 1980, the City Council conducted 
the hearing to consider the conceptual design of plaintiff's 
second 32-unit 65' high project, as presented in Exhibit 39. (R 
359). 
32. At the conclusion of the public hearing and its 
deliberations, the City Council reversed the decision of the 
Planning Commission. It found that the design concepts were 
visually incompatible and contrary to development standards. The 
Council denied conceptual approval of Appellant-Scherbel's 
proposed project as reflected in Exhibit 39. (R 360). 
33. On February 25, 1980, appellant-Scherbel filed suit and 
temporarily enjoined scheduled publication of the nR-2H" and 
rezoninq ordinances. (R 361). 
34. On March 3, 1980, Mr. Scherbel filed another 
application with HLC, known as Case 190, which schematically 
proposed a third project 42' high, with 18 units on two of the 
four original parcels. (R 361, 2). 
4Exhibit 12P. 
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35. ^his application was heard by HLC on March 4, 1980 and 
referred to its subcommittee. This third project, together with 
a fourth 24-unit alternative, was prepared and considered by the 
HLC committee on March 17, 1980. (Exhibit 43 P). It was later 
abandoned when the ,fR-2H" and rezpning ordinances became 
effective March 28, 1980. (R 361).
 w 
36. A subsequent review of all conceptual drawings was 
conducted on each of the four projects introduced by appellant-
Scherbel; to~wit: #1, Exhibit 37P, being 75 feet hiqh with 35 
units and amenities; #2, Exhibit 39P, being 65 feet high with 32 
units and amenities; #3, Exhibit 43P, being about 42 feet high . 
with 18 units and less amenities; and #4, an alternative to #3 
above, with 24 units and amenities. A review of each proposed 
project reveals that each failed to comply with City, design 
criteria; these delects include the following: ^; 
a. Defined features violated various minimum zoning 
requirements then existing in the "R-6" district; 
b » I t could not Qualify for zoning approval, until and 
unless, variances were obtained from the Board of 
Adjustment—if possible—regardless of design approval; and 
c. The partial schematic drawings of the proposals 
were so sketchy that they were incomplete and inadequate in 
detail for conducting a complete review, even of established 
objective requirements then existing in the "R-6" 
district. (R 517-543, 362-368). 
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37. Appellant-Scherbelfs architect knew the various 
projects proposed in the above described exhibits did not meet 
the minimum requirements of the "R-6" district and could not be 
approved, even on a schematic basis. He also knew that they were 
otherwise too preliminary and incomplete for zoning review, let 
alone application for or issuance of a building permit. (R 478-
81, 488-490). 
38. The architect testified that before he would submit an 
application for a building permit (Exhibit 41D), upon which he 
could expect zoning approval to be given and a permit issued, he 
would have to generate and prepare the necessary working 
drawinqs, detailed information and related specifications. Such 
preparation is a large bulk of the architect's assignment, time 
and expense; such work would require at least three (3) months or 
more time. None of this work has been done on any of the various 
projects proposed. (R 485-490, 477-78). 
39. Each of the four projects contained in Exhibits 37, 39 
and 43 have features which would and did not meet the minimum 
criteria for multiple-family dwellings, under the new "R-2H" 
provision.15 (R 517-543, 362-368). 
15In comparing "R-6" and "R-2H" requirements, it should be noted 
multiple-family dwellings can be constructed in both districts 
after design approval, but under different conditions and design 
criteria. "R-6" authorizes up to a 75-foot high multiple family 
structure as a permitted right, assuming setbacks, parking area, 
and the like are provided. "R-2H" permits multiple-family uses 
as "conditional uses", but imposes more restrictive desian 
criteria, such as maximum heights (45 feet), reduced density, (19 
(footnote continued) 
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I "SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1# Appellant-Scherbel had the obligation to obtain the 
trial transcript and such other facts and documents, admitted in 
the trial below, to demonstrate to this Court that the trial 
court's findings were unsupported by the recori or that it 
manifestly misapplied applicable law.f. Appellfant's brief is 
required to reference that record to demonstrate he has met its 
burden of proof to reverse the lower court judqment. 
Appellant has failed to provide this Court the transcript 
and documents referred to in his brief; as a consequence, he has 
failed to reference the record in his brief. The City contests 
his version of the record but is unable to respond because it Was 
not provided as required by the rules. Therefore, appellant-
Schdrbel's factual statement should be stricken or not-
considered? and, the appeal should be dismissed because there is 
no factual premise to support appellant-Scherbelfs argument, 
2. Uncontroverted evidence before the lower Court and now 
before this Court clearly supports the lower tribunal's Findings 
of Fact and Judgment. It demonstrates that appellant-Scherbel 
submitted such sketchy and preliminary plans, which did not meet 
even existing zoning, that he was not entitled to a buildinq 
permit on any of the development proposals submitted. Further, 
the "plans" were hastily prepared and made only in response to 
units per acre), and some increased setbacks. 
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prospective zoning and land use changes to City law proposed to 
protect the Historic District of the Avenues, where appellant's 
property was located. As such, his plans failed to meet the test 
of this Court's decision in Western Equities and no vesting 
occurred to entitle him to a building permit on any of the 
numerous proposals submitted to the City. 
3. The Historic District ordinance and its appeal 
procedures comport with constitutional principles and are 
consistent with State enabling power. The final hearing v 3 
mechanism before the City Council is consistent with other zoning £ 
laws, which provide for the City Council to hear appeals from the >s 
Planning and Zoning Commission. 
However, even if the hearing process should be viewed as 
executive rather than legislative, the Mayor approved the hearing us: 
process before the Council and appellant-Scherbel has no basis on .:& 
which to complain on the procedure utilized in this case. This : 
conclusion is particularly compelled by the fact that the complex 
issues of land use can be viewed as a mixture of executive and 
legislative functions; great deference should be allowed local 
government to experiment and prepare ordinances to solve local 
problems, where they are not clearly unconstitutional or in 
derogation of statutory law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT-SCHERBEL CANNOT SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN 
OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
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FINDINGS ARE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE OR THAT IT MISAPPLIED THE APPLICABLE 
LAW FROM THE RECORD BEFORE THIS COURT. 
It is the well settled law of Utah that Findings of Fact of 
the trial court and the lower court judgment are presumptively 
valid. The appellant has the burden,, from the record below, to 
demonstrate that the trial court ruled contrary to the weight of 
the evidence or manifestly misapplied applicable law. Regarding 
this well recognized presumption of lower court decisional 
validity, this Court held: 
"It being a well settled rule of judicial review 
that the trial court's findings will not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly against the 
weight of the evidence or it manifestly appears 
the Court misapplied the law to the established 
facts." Elton v. Utah State Retirement Board, 28 
U.2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972) citing Hardy v. 
Hendrickson, 27 U.2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972). ^ 
In applying those legal principles, the Court's attention is 
directed to the fact that appellant-Scherbel has failed to make 
even one citation to the record of the lower court proceedings, 
which were transmitted to this Court. To the contrary, the only 
references in appellant's brief are to trial exhibits, which Mr. 
Scherbel did not bring to this Court. Neither did Scherbel bring 
the trial transcript, even though his first briefed issued claims 
an equitable theory of "vesting" which is desparately hinged on 
the facts. Similarly, not one reference is made to the Amended 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law which were entered by 
Court interlineation, after consideration anr* exhaustive lower 
court review. (R 353-369). 
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However, even more revealing and offensive, as a matter of 
substance, is the myopic selection of favorable allegations or 
characterization made by appellant-Scherbel. His selective 
factual assertions seem to be made on the premise that omission 
of adverse facts will negate their existence. To the contrary, 
on appeal the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to 
the party prevailing below. 
In addition, appellant-Scherbel is in flagrant violation of 
Rule 75(p) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires 
the record to be filed with the Court and for a party to make 
specific references to that record in Supreme Court briefing. 
Such reauirements are to assure that the actual trial developed 
facts are properly before this Court, rather than fanciful 
imaginings or wishful and gratuitous creation of non-existent 
trial record by the parties. It also prevents a waste of court 
effort and friction between counsel in trying to divine what 
transpired below from the biased or selective memories of the 
parties. 
This Court has previously ruled that factual statements 
should not be considered by this Court. State v. Williamson, 674 
P.2d 732, 734 (Utah 1983). It is, therefore, respectfully 
submitted that appellant-Scherbel's recitation of fact should be 
stricken and not considered by this Court. Also, applying the 
presumptive validity of the lower court findings and decision, 
they should be affirmed. 
-20-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE CITY HAD 
THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO AMEND 
ZONING ORDINANCES, CREATE A HISTORICAL 
DISTRICT, AND MAKE THEM APPLICABLE TO 
APPELLANT, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
It is the uncontested law of this, State that property owners 
hold their property subject t^ the zoning ordinances of local 
municipalities. This is true even when the ordinances may 
severely restrict or limit the range of possible uses; it is also 
true if development criteria are changed which were formerly 
available and contemplated by a property owner, so long as the 
ordinances substantially advance legitimate Governmental goals. 
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, et al. ^.. 617 P. 2d 
388 (Utah, 1980). i .
 v 
Illustrative of these conclusions are decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. It has upheld the right of municipalities to 
change ordinances to preserve their environment; to regulate 
uses, density and the orderly development of residential 
districts; to require compatibility reviews for various reasons; 
and to preserve historical sites and districts. See, Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 65 L.Ed.2d 106, 100 S.Ct. 2138 
(1980), approving a change from 1 acre to 5 acre lots, with 
compatibility review; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 98 S.Ct. 2646 (1978), authorizing 
an historical compatability review; generally, see also: Euclid 
v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 71 L.Ed. 303, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926). 
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In the lower courtf appellant-Scherbel did not controvert 
the City's position and evidence that the independent downzoning 
changes and the adoption of the flR-2H" and Historic District 
provisions were done for important, countervailing and compelling 
public interests, unequivically recognized by the Supreme 
Court. However, the relief Mr. Scherbel now seeks requires this 
Court to find that these ordinances are invalid or should be 
subordinated to plaintiff's private right to develop. 
Clearly, the City's creation of conditional uses, reduction 
of permitted maximum height and density; requirement of design 
review; and increases of certain design criteria, to reaulate 
future development on the City's lower avenues are well within 
the general and designated zoning powers of the City. Each is 
designed to protect, preserve and enhance the quality of life and 
preserve the character of the Avenues Historic District. Such 
important goals and public interests should not be sacrificed or 
subordinated to permit private economic windfall to appellant, 
who knowingly assumed the risk of pending changes and > 
intentionally failed to take the necessary actions, which would 
have entitled him to secure a building permit, prior to the 
pending changes. 
The legitimacy of the governmental purpose in these -
ordinances cannot be raised the first time on appeal and even, if 
the contrary were true, they facially survive challenge. 
Appellant-Scherbel's challenge of them must fail. 
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POINT I I I 
THE UNCONTPOVEPTED EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTA-
BLISHED APPELLANT-SCHERBEL WAS NOT AND HAS 
NEVER BEEN ENTITLED TO ISSUANCE OF A BUILDING 
PERMIT; THEREFORE, THERE HAS BEEN NO UNLAWFUL 
DENIAL UPON WHICH MANDAMUS CAN BE BASED. 
A p p e l l a n t - S c h e r b e l a l l e g e d t h a t on Q-r/-about March 2 4 , 1980%,. 
t h r o u g h March 2 8 , 1 9 8 0 , he a t t e m p t e d t o s e c u r e a b u i l d i n g p e r m i t , 
which was i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e f u s e d . T h a t a l l e g a t i o n was d i s p u t e d 
by o t h e r w i t n e s s e s and even c o n t r a d i c t e d by t h e a p p e l l a n t . For 
e x a m p l e , i n v e r i f i e d p l e a d i n g s , Mr. S c h e r b e l s t a t e d he r e l i e d 
upon and s u b m i t t e d t h e 3 5 ~ u n i t p l a n s s u b m i t t e d O c t o b e r 2 4 , 1979 
( E x h i b i t 3 7 P ) ; c o n t r a r y w i s e , a t t r i a l t e s t i f i e d he made h i s -v 
" i n q u i r i e s based upon t h e 3 2 - u n i t p r o j e c t of E x h i b i t 39P*"^.-^-r^,..aS''% 
F u r t h e r , b a s e d upon u n c o n t r o v e r t e d e v i d e n c e a l r e a d y c i t e d 
i n t h e S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s , i t h a s been a d m i t t e d and i r r e f u t a b l y 
p r o v e n t h a t no a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a b u i l d i n g p e r m i t was e v e r ^, 
s u b m i t t e d t o a C i t y B u i l d i n g O f f i c i a l . I n f a c t , under then^ 
e x i s t i n g l a w , no p e r m i t c o u l d have been g r a n t e d ^for any of t h e 
p r o j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g E x h i b i t 39P . T h u s , even assuming a r g u e n d o a 
p r e m a t u r e a p p l i c a t i o n had been m a d e — s e p a r a t e and a n a r t from 
h i s t o r i c a l c o m p a t i b i l i t y d e s i g n r e v i e w - - i t c o u l d n o t be a c c e p t e d 
by t h e C i t y b e c a u s e of t h e numerous zon ing v i o l a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d 
i n t h e p r e l i m i n a r y p l a n s , t h e i n c o m p l e t e d a t a f o r r e q u i r e d z o n i n g 
r e v i e w ; and t h e l a c k of work ing d r a w i n g s , d e m o n s t r a t i n g 
S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s , P a r a g r a p h s 7 , 8 , 1 4 , 1 8 , 2 3 , and 3 6 - 3 9 . 
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1 7 
compliance with various city ordinances. Appellant-Scherbel 
and his architect knew such plans would not qualify to receive 
zoning approval nor a building permit. Therefore, he could have 
no reasonable expectation that a permit could be applied for or 
issued. See Western Equities, supra. 
Plaintiff simply cannot show any unlawful refusal. This 
Court has already acknowledqed that mandamus will not lie, unless 
the petitioner had submitted all the applications, plans and 
specifications, demonstrating compliance with applicable City ^ 
codes and ordinances. Thus, the lower court was correct in ^ 
ruling no mandamus would properly lie based on appellant's m-
premature application and inadequate and non-complying plans. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COUPT PROPERLY HELD APPELLANT IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE RELIEF FROM THE 
COURT TO ESTOP THE CITY FROM APPLYING THE nR-
2H" PROVISIONS BECAUSE HE HAD NO PROJECT THAT 
WAS ENTITLED TO VESTED RIGHTS TO DEVELOP. 
Appellant-Scherbel claims he has rights to develop under "R-
6", which he claims are provisions vested to him and a shield 
from him otherwise complying with the newer ,fR-2Hn provisions. 
Such an equity claim requests the court estop the City from 
enforcing its legislation enacted for the public's benefit, 
thereby giving appellant a benefit of laws no longer in effect. 
In such equity claims, relief is not granted unless a plaintiff 
m 
17Section 51-32-7, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1965, as amended. 
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can meet the heavy burden of demonstrating one party has taken 
unconscionable or unfair advantage of the other. This is 
particularly true in zoning matters. See, Western Land Equities 
v. City of Logan, et al. , 617 P.2d 335 (Utah, 1980). 
Western Equities, is a watershed zonina and land use 
development casfe in which this Court adopted a variation of an 
admittedly minority position on vested rights and zoning 
estoppel. It recognized that the majority position generally 
requires a property owner to obtain a building permit and be 
under actual and substantial physical construction in order to 
prove "substantial reliance" upon the permit, before becoming 
1 8 shielded from changes in zoning ordinances. 
The court noted that prepermit or general preconstruction 
activities such as preparing architectural drawing or plans, 
surveying and cleaning of land (prior to official approval of the 
pflans) would not be substantial enough to justify estoppel. This 
Court examined and rejected the majority and minority positions 
to formulate its own objective rule, in order to establish some 
predictability--predictability which the City submits must be 
even-handedly applied. -
Appellant-Scherbel relies on Western Equities to support his 
vesting claim, but City submits that application of the Western 
Land Equities case to the facts involved in this litigation 
Western Equities, supra, at p. 392. 
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dictates appellant has no vested rights. In fact, contrary to 
appellant's claim, the key facts of record demonstrate that to 
give appellant vested rights would violate the spirit, letter and 
express purpose of Western Equities. The following will analyse 
this case in light of the specifics of the former landmark 
decision. 
A. Comparison of Facts 
Western Equities involved a property owner of "M-lff land 
that submitted a plan to the City of Logan for approval of a 
subdivision of single-family homes. It was stipulated that the 
subdivision plan met all of the minimum requirements applicable 
to subdivisions and zoninq. The procedures reauired approval 
of preliminary and final plans from the Planning Commission with 
administrative appeal from an adverse decision to the City 
Council. 
The Planning Commission became concerned that single-family 
subdivisions were not appropriate uses in manufacturing zones, 
althouah authorized by the ordinances. Approval on the pending 
request was delayed until intervening legislation was passed 
after which the subdivision was denied. The denial was affirmed 
on appeal to the City Council. 
This Court noted: (1) The proposal for zoning changes arose 
19Id. at p. 390. 
20Id. at p. 389. 
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after and out of the proposed project; (2) the legislative 
changes while legitimate, were not something the owner could 
anticipate; and (3) there was onlv one plan or alternative before 
the court; it had been produced in reliance on the "M-l" zoning 
and it also had complied in all particulars with the minimum 
requirements of applicable ordinances at the time of 
submission. As submitted, the plan could have been approved. 
By uncontroverted facts set forth above in the Statement of 
Facts, the opposite is true in this case. The facts of the case 
at bar demonstrate: 
1. The proposal for changes in zoning predate the 
consideration of any of the plaintiff's projects. This fact is 
true whether one compares the time of formal filing, the initial 
formal review by City, initial action on proposals, or council 
action. 
2. Appellant-Scherbel as property owner, knew of proposals 
for changing zoning before initiating preparation of any plans. 
He admitted he was attempting to pursue some kind of development 
before changes might restrict the opportunities and selected an 
architect to try to push it through. He and his architect also 
Formal filings occurring on Petition No. 569 on July 5, 1979 
vs. October 24, 1979; initial review by Planning Commission on 
September 13, 1979 vs. November 6, 1979 presentation; Petition 
569 approved November 8, 1979 by Planning Commission vs. HLC 
denies 35~unit project December 4, 1979, but Planning Commission 
reverses January 10, 1980 on 32 units; Council hearings January 
31, 1980 on rfR-2Hn vs. February 19 on appeal where design is 
disapproved. 
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knew of the complications of the Historic District Design Review 
process. 
3. Instead of one project being submitted, appellant 
submitted four different projects proposals, alternatively and 
confusingly proposing plans for 35, 32, 24 and 18 units. 
However, none of the proposed projects complied with minimum 
zoning requirements in the existing ,fP-6" zoning reouirements; in 
fact, there were numerous and obvious violations. 
Thus, the the operative facts are not similar and Land 
Equities is not helpful to appellant's case. 
B. All of proposed projects fail to meet the objective 
vesting standards set forth in Western Equities. 
This Court reviewed existing case law on "vesting" and held: 
"The above competing interests are best accommo-
dated in our view by adopting the rule that an 
applicant is entitled to a building permit or 
subdivision approval if: (1) his proposed 
development meets the zoninq requirements in 
existence; (2) at the time of his application and 
if he proceeds with reasonable diligence; (3) 
absent a compelling, countervailing public 
interest; (4) Furthermore, if a city or county has 
initiated proceedings to amend its zoning 
ordinances, a landowner who subsequently makes 
application for a permit is not entitled to rely 
on the original zoning classification." Id. at 
396 (emphasis added). 
Under this test, even prior to the adoption of the R-2H" 
provisions, appellant-Scherbel's project would have had to: (a) 
meet existing minimum "R-6" requirements; and (b) obtain 
uncontested historic design review or wait for five months after 
the particular plan had been submitted to the Landmarks 
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Committee. However, the following facts exist: 
1. It is uncontroverted that none of Appellant's proposed 
projects conformed to existing nR-6M minimum reauirements and his 
architect knew it. He knew there were violations or aspects that 
could not be given approval. Be, perhaps> cpuld have designed to 
comply, but Appellant-Scherbel wanted to explore alternative 
plans which maximized the amenities and desired number of 
units. It was a business decision and assumption of risk. No 
rights existed or vested to any of those four plans under the "R-
6" zoning. 
The Historic District reauired either final approval of the 
visual compatibility of the project or, if denied, a minimum 5-
month mandatory waiting1 oeriod, before a building permit (Exhibit 
41D) could be accepted and issued by the City. That permit 
process was premised on the assumption that the plan complied 
with all codes and ordinances; however, not one of the four 
projects submitted by the appellant met these requirements. For 
example: r 
(a) Exhibit 37, for 35 units (for which an application was 
filed on October 24, 1979 and was rejected by HLC) was never 
approved by anyone; 
(b) Exhibit 39 (the 32-unit project) was qenerated just 
prior to approval by Planning Commission in January of 1980, but 
was rejected by City Council on appeal. This is the plan 
plaintiff claims has vested and for which he sought a building 
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permit in March of 3 980; but which did not nualify for a permit 
because the 5 month waiting period had not expired. Further, 
even if the action by the City Council was invalidatedf zoning 
approval could not be given to Exhibit 39 due to its numerous 
zoning violations. These violations alone defeat any claim of 
the five months or vesting for the 32-unit project; 
(c) Appellant's application for the 18-unit, with the 24-
unit alternative (Exhibit 43) was submitted as a new project in 
March of 1980. It did not meet the "R-6" requirements and was 
abandoned after April 1, 1980. No requests for a building permit 
under this plan were ever alleged. 
Therefore, it is clear, that appellant failed to meet the 
first requirement of vesting under Western Eauities and the lower 
court correctly ruled. 
2. It is the City's position that the application reauired 
by Western Equities is, in fact, an application for a building 
permit which the owner or architect could reasonably expect to be 
granted at least zoning approval for a building permit, if not 
the building permit itself. Appellant-Scherbel contends the 
application form for design review in an historical district, 
which he filed on October 24, 1979 for a 35-unit project, is the 
application upon which his rights are vested. However, at trial 
appellant, his architect and Mr. Hafey of the City each testified 
a subsequent building permit application (Ex. 41D) would be 
required when the process proceeded beyond the initial schematic 
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preliminary conceptual to definitive plans. 
If Mr. Scherbel's contention is accepted by the Court, then 
he should equally be vested in rights to construct a convalescent 
center as filed in 1977, and the two project alternatives for 18 
and 24 units filed in Exhibit 43 in March of 1980. Obviously 
such a conclusion is contrary to the intent expressed by the 
Court in Western Equities. 
However, interestingly, Mr. Scherbel claims vesting in 
Exhibit 39 for which he never filed an application before HLC; 
this assertion is even further from the policy and rationale of 
this Court's ruling. 
It is clear from the holding in Western Equities that in 
order to vest, a building application must be complete and in 
compliance with all applicable zoning and building codes at the 
time it is submitted. The City submits that this holding 
requires that the project and an application for a building 
permit be designed in sufficient detail that both the developer 
and City know essential details of the plan. Only then can the 
predictability spoken of by the Court result. 
In this case, Mr. Scherbel is really asking the Court to 
estop the City from enforcing its ordinances in order to allow 
his architect to design a fifth project of unknown size, 
dimensions, materials, and units. He seeks to construct a 
project which would finally be designed to meet nR-6n 
requirements, but be exempted from design review and the 
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provisions of the "R-2Hff ordinance. 
However, granting the plaintiff the right to now redesign 
his proiects to meet existing reouirements that he knew about but 
which he intentionally chose to disregard, would be contrary to 
existing ordinances and the Supreme Court's holding in Western 
Equities. It would not be granting plaintiff the right to 
proceed, but the preroaatiye to start over, free of assumed risk. 
3. Allowing appellant to construct a new project under "R-
6" zoning free from "R-2HM provisions encourages waste of public 
resources and inappropriate speculation. Such an unwise court 
liberalization of the standards for vesting would encourage 
developers to file spurious, meaningless and alternative plans 
simply to protect all options. The review process would, thus, 
be unnecessarily made more complex and plan submission a game 
with no good faith intent to file definitive plans for meaningful 
land use review. 
These fears are personified by appellant's conduct in this 
case. Mr. Scherbel wants to be rewarded, after he intentionally 
entered a race against the clock to beat pending zoning law 
changes. It rewards him for his mistakes, omissions, assumption 
of risk and other business judgments, at the expense of good land 
use policy and the public interests. 
It is in the public interest to have an historical district 
preserved and to save the rights of other property owners. It is 
in the public interest to preserve this historical district from 
-32-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
incompatible development and commercial speculation. These are 
significant counter vailing and competing interests which should 
be respected, especially in light of appellant-Scherbelfs acts 
and omissions to act in full knowledge of the history and pendinq 
changes in zoning in the area. f 
4. Western Equities specifically notes that one who 
proceeds while zoning changes are pending is not entitled to rely 
on equity. This is true because there is no good faith reliance 
and an informed assumption of risk. 
There are no facts suggesting that the City did anything to 
stall or delay review of Mr. Scherbel's various projects to 
benefit the pending zoning. further, there are no facts to 
suggest that the City, in anyway, passed a zoning change to 
discriminate*against appellant's desire to develop. There is no 
reason, in equity, to shield Mr. Scherbel from the results of his 
own decisions and actions. 
In summary, Mr. Scherbel had no project which meets the 
requirements of the Western Equities case. That case, when 
applied to the facts of the case at bar, demonstrates that Mr. 
Scherbel has no equitable claim for vesting of development 
rights, under the superseded "R-6" zoning. This Court has taken 
an important and novel position to fairly balance competing 
interests, by setting up measurable standards to provide 
predictability for developers and governments as well. The 
standards were framed to offer some protection to developers who 
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had substantially proceeded with development from last-minute 
unanticipated shifts in public policy, without encouraging or 
rewarding premature speculation. Those same standards 
specifically note that no such protection or equitable relief is 
given for those who intentionally undertake the development 
process, when zoning change proposals are pending.2^ 
To grant appellant-Scherbel vested rights to proceed with 
developing any one of the four projects shown in the exhibits 
requires the Court to ignore the objective requirements of 
Western Equities and encourages and rewards disregard of the old 
ordinances, which Scherbel desires to rely upon. Alternatively, 
to grant appellant a vested right to design a new project plan, 
to meet old code provisions violates the objective predictability 
underpinning the entire decision. 
The City submits such a rulina would be error and would 
destroy the very purpose the Court labored so carefully in 
Western Equities to protect. 
POINT V 
THE HEARING BEFORE THE CITY COUNCIL REGARDING 
THE APPEAL OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S 
DECISION ON DESIGN REVIEW COMPATABILITY WAS 
CONSISTENT WITH BOTH STATE LAW AND CITY 
ORDINANCES. 
When the Historic District and Landmark Sites ordinance was 
Id at p. 396. 
Id. at p. 396. 
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Ikacted, the City included, as a discretionary riqht, an appeal 
from a decision of the Planning Commission on design review 
cornpatability to the Board of City Commissioners. With the 
inception of the council/mayor form of government, the Board of 
Commissioners ceased to exist; the right of appeal did not. 
Local governments are bound by the provisions of their own 
ordinances. West Gallery v. Salt Lake City, 537 P.2d 1027 (Utah, 
1975). 
After the change in governmental form, the City, therefore, 
had to determine whether the appeal from the planning commission 
should be heard before the council or the mayor, not if an appeal 
right should be had. The answer to that question was made by 
this Court in the case of Martindale v. Anderson. Here the 
Court was asked to construe the separate .powers of the mayor and 
the council under the Alternate Form of^Government Act* 
Specifically, the Court determined that the authority to approve 
subdivisions and to acquire and dispose of City property was an 
executive function, held solely by the Mayor. Both the executive 
and legislative branches had claimed the authority, based upon 
differing statutory provisions. The Court ruled as follows: 
"The inconsistencies in the terminology of the 
statutes in referring to the approving authority 
[of subdivision] is of some concern, but is by no 
means over-powering for the following reasons. 
* * * It is obvious that the statutes do not 
undertake to vest any authority to approve plats 
581 P.2d 1022 (Utah, 1978). 
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but only to recognize existing authority to 
approve and require it to act. Hence, their use 
of the terms 'legislative body', 'legislative 
authority1, and 'governing body' must be deemed to 
have been in their generic sense only, and not an 
attempt to designate the functions of any 
particular governing body. 
"It is also to be observed that the statutes are 
of long duration, having been enacted before 
strong mayor and council/mayor forms of government 
were provided for, and when only traditional forms 
of government were available. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that they contemplate only a single 
governing body exercising both legislative and 
executive powers." Id. at 1028 (emphasis added). 
The court's response to this new form of government and the 
governing statutes was to hold Logan City's ordinance and the 
statutes valid and to construe them in light of the intent of the 
legislature in providing for a new form of government. The 
Optional Form of Government Act specifically provides that cities 
adopting an alternate form of government "shall retain and have 
the right, powers and duties now or hereafter granted to 
25 municipalities." The power to grant appeals bemq retained, it 
was necessary only to determine which branch of government was to 
exercise that power. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court should aqain do 
likewise. It should not hold the City's ordinance void because 
it includes the term "board of commissioners"? rather, it should 
recognize the "existing authority" formerly held by the Board of 
Commissioners and recognize the authority and duty of the City to 
Section 10-3-1205, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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designate and delegate its governmental powers to the aporopriate 
branches, under the council-mayor form of government. 
In doing so, this Court has held that in dealina with novel 
problems, such as this under a new form of city government, 
elected officials must be given wide discretion and latitude in 
"solving municipal problems: - * 
" [M]unicipal officials must also have the legal . ' i.
 : 
power to deal creatively with extraordinary or 
unforeseen circumstances in the provision of 
municipal services." Banberry Development v. 
South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899, 904 (Utah 1981). 
The City maintains that the hearing conducted by the City 
Council and the provisions for such appeals under the historic 
district and -related ffR-2Hn provisions, was^ proper for three ^  
reasons. First, the Planning Commission^is a statutorily 
authorized body created by City ordinance to advise the 
legislative body, the City Council, in zoning matters. ° it-
appears is obvious, logical and reasonable that the subordinate 
body should be held accountable to the Council, pursuant to the 
authority granted to the Planning Commission. The Supreme Court 
27 has so held in Thurston v. Cache County. 
Second, the Mayor, as an exercise of his executive powers in 
order to clear up any ambiguity in procedure, authorized the 
Council to hear the appeal and delegated the Council to hear the 
^Section 10-9-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
27626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981), 
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matter. The Mayor also acquiesced in the decision of the City 
Council. (See Statement of Facts). 
The leaal power of cities to provide that some governmental 
powers may be delegated or acquiesced in is recognized by the 
Supreme Court decision (again involving the Logan City Council, 
rendered two years after Martindale) in Western Land Equities v. 
Logan City , supra. In Western Equities the Supreme Court 
reviewed Logan City's ordinance which set forth the procedure for 
obtaining subdivision approval. The ordinance required appeal of 
an adverse Planning Commission to the city council, not the 
98 
mayor. This procedure was a reversal of the contested issue of 
the court in Martindale. In the later case, the governmental 
branches were not contesting areas of jurisdiction and the City 
hearing procedure before the Council was not held invalid. 
Similarly, it should be noted that the situation now before 
the Court is unlike that before the Supreme Court in Martindale 
and more similar to Western Equities. In Martindale , the city 
council and the mayor were challenging the power of each otherf 
under the new form of government. The Supreme Court ruled that 
the city council had no executive powers which it could delegate 
to the mayor and, therefore, its unwarranted intrusion into that 
area was improper. The Court denied the city council's right to 
unilaterally supervise the mayor's action in acquiring or 
'Western Equities, supra at 389. 
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disposing of city property or approving subdivisions. 
The matter now before the Court involves no contested issue 
of procedure or power between the council and the mayor. The 
mayor and council having resolved the issue for the City by 
agreement and city ordinance, it is not a proper issue, to be 
raised by appellant-Scherbel.'- It is either a proper Council 
function or if an executive power, one delegated by the Mayor to 
the Council for hearing. Under either, Mr. Scherbel has no cause 
to challenge the procedure. 
Third, the City's legislative body (the City Council) has 
been given the power to enact the zoning ordinances and 
regulations of the City, pursuant to the recommendation of the 
Planning Commission." The State legislature has clearly 
designated the city council as th£ prpper body to hear and 
determine zoning-'issues; the law states: 
"For the purpose of-promoting health, safety, 
morals and the general welfare of the community, 
the legislative body of cities and towns is 
empowered to regulate and restrict the height, 
number of stories and size of building and other 
structures, the percentage of lot that may be 
occupied, the size of yards, courts, and other 
open spaces, the density of population, and the 
location and use of buildings, structures and land 
for trade, industry, residence, or other 
purposes." Section 10-9-1, Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
as amended (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is absolutely clear that the City Council did not usurp 
an improper function by hearing the appeal from the Planning 
Section 10-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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Commission. In factf this body was specifically empowered to do 
so by the State legislature and by executive order of the Mayor. 
Supportive of this conclusion is the holding of this Court 
which recognizes that local government has reasonable flexibility 
to address creatively municipal problems. It held: 
,f[I]t must be realized that it is impractical for 
statutes to spell out to the last detail all of 
the things city governments must do to perform the 
functions imposed upon them by law. This court 
has in numerous cases recognized this and has held 
that cities have those powers which are expressly 
granted and also those necessarily implied to 
carry out such responsibilities." Call v. City of 
West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218, 219 (Utah 1979) 
(emphasis added). 
Similarly, in reviewinq the powers of counties and 
municipalities, the Court again recently held: 
"When the state has granted welfare power to local 
governments, those governments have independent 
authority apart from, and in addition to, specific 
grants of authority to pass ordinances which are 
reasonably and appropriately related to the 
objectives of that power, i.e., providing for the 
public safety, health, morals, and welfare, 
(citations omitted) Any the courts will not 
interfere with the legislative choice of the means 
selected unless it is arbitray, or is directly 
prohibited by or is inconsistent with the policy 
of the state or the United States. * * * But 
specific grants should generally be construed with 
reasonable latitude in light of the broad language 
of the general welfare clause which may supplement 
the power found in a specific allegation. 
"Broad construction of the powers of counties and 
cities is consistent with the current needs of 
local governments." State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 
1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 
The City respectfully submits that the actions of the Mayor 
and the City Council regarding the hearing conducted by the City 
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Council from the Plannina Commission's decis ion was and is 
consistent with all of the state statutes pertaining to enabling 
power of cities. The City ordinance and policy decisions are 
well within both the discretion of the Mayor and the jurisdiction 
of the City Council. The Court should respect and give deference 
to their resolution of hearingsvon these difficult and complex 
land use issues. 
POINT VI 
AN AGGRIEVED PERSONfS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL CANNOT BE ABRIDGED. 
Assuming, arguendo, the Court is not pursuaded that the City 
Council lawfully heard the appeal regardina Appellant-Scherbelfs 
proposed project, appellant still should not prevail. 
The City's ordinance provides for an appeal from the 
Planning Commission's decision. If the hearing before the City 
Council was void, the matter must be remanded for proper action 
before an authorized forum. The right of appeal created by 
ordinance cannot be extinguished, ignored, or bypassed. Any 
attempt to do so would be in derogation of the City's own 
lawfully-enacted procedures and constitutional principles of due 
process of law. Thus, the remedy is not reversal, but remand to 
the Mayor. 
POINT VII 
THE HEARING CONDUCTED BY THE CITY COUNCIL IN 
FULLY REVIEWING THE PLANNING COMMISSION'S 
DECISION WAS VALID IN ALL RESPECTS. 
The Planning Commission is an advisory body, created 
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pursuant to statute, to the City Council. The Commission is 
charged with the responsibility of making recommendations to the 
Council regarding all zoning matters. 
It is fatuous to suggest, as the appellant-Rcherbel has 
done, that the Council is precluded from inquiring fully into the 
actions or recommendations of its subordinate and advisory 
department. Thurston, supra. The plaintiff has cited no 
authority whatsoever for his position that the scope of the 
Council's hearing was improper. 
The minutes before the Council and the Planning Commission 
both indicate items other than the development standards were 
discussed. It is acknowledged that such items were presented to 
both the Planning Commission and the City Council; however, it is 
submitted that none of these other items were significant. 
This Court dismissed a similar allegation regarding the 
scope of a hearing conducted before a County Commission, as 
follows: 
"Plaintiffs specifically point out that the 
Planning Commission and Board of County 
Commissioners of Cache County placed undue 
reliance on objections filed by landowners in the 
vicinity. While it is true that the consent of 
neighboring landowners may not be made a criterion 
for the issuance or denial or a conditional use 
permit, (citation omitted) there is no impropriety 
in the solicitation of, or reliance upon, 
information which may be furnished by other 
Section 10-9-4, Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, as amended. 
Section 10-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
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landowners in the vicinity of the subject property, 
at a public hearing. There is ample evidence to 
suggest that the input of neighboring landowners 
in the instant case was of this advisory 
nature." Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 
(Utah, 1980) at 445. 
Appellant-Scherbel has not challenged the Firtdinq of Facts and 
the Conclusions of Law of the City Council in this lawsuit* which 
set forth the basis of the denial of the City Council. .Said 
findings and conclusions are based totally on the development 
standards and speak for themselves. 
It is respectfully submitted that the conduct of the City 
Council in reviewing the decision of the Planning Commission in 
this matter was entirely proper and should be upheld. 
POINT VIII 
THE CITY'S NEWLY-ENACTED "R-^H" ZONING . .. 
ORDINANCE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF 
PROCEDURAL FEATURES. _ 
A. THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO HAVE THE MATTER 
HEARD BY THE CITY'S BOARE) OF ADJUSTMENT. 
One t h r u s t of t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s a rgument i s t h a t t h e , fR-2Hn 
zon ing o r d i n a n c e i m p r o p e r l y d e l e g a t e s m a t t e r s t o HLC JLnu 
d e r o g a t i o n of t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e Poard of A d j u s t m e n t . r 
The flR-2Hn z o n i n g c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s e t s f o r t h s p e c i f i c z o n i n a 
r e g u l a t i o n s f o r h i s t o r i c a l r e s i d e n t i a l n e i g h b o r h o o d s . Some u s e s 
a r e p e r m i t t e d by r i g h t and o t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g m u l t i p l e - f a m i l y 
d w e l l i n g s , a r e a u t h o r i z e d a s c o n d i t i o n a l u s e s . The o r d i n a n c e 
r e q u i r e s t h a t b e f o r e t h e Board may app rove t h e c o n d i t i o n a l u s e , 
t h e p l a n must r e c e i v e d e s i g n r e v i e w a p p r o v a l f o r c o m p a t i b i l i t y i n 
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the district. That desian review must be obtained from the HLC 
or the appeal process. 
If a favorable recommendation is given by HLC or through the 
appeal process, then the application is forwarded to the Board of 
32 Adjustment. The Board may then either approve or recommend 
denial of the project. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Thurston, supra, is 
dispositive of appellant-Scherbel's argument in this case. In 
Thurston, this Court analyzed Section 17-27-16, ° which is almost 
identical to Section 10-9-12,34 Utah Code Annotated. Both 
sections deal with powers granted to the county's and the city's 
respective boards of adjustment. This Court held: 
"The act authorizes, but does not require, the 
county commission to invest the board of 
adjustments, by resolution, with the power to 
issue special exceptions to general zoning 
ordinances. Where, and only where, such an 
investing resolution has been adopted, the board 
of adjustments is aiven statutory authority to 
hear and decide requests for special exceptions. 
"Plaintiffs infer, from the foregoing statutory 
framework, that the board of adjustments is the 
only proper authority for the issuance of 
conditional use permits and must be invested with 
the power so to act; also that the board of 
adjustments is the only proper appellate body 
within the administrative system . . . Such a 
construction not only ignores the plain import of 
32Section 51-41A-10, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1965, as amended. 
33Attached as Appendix 2. 
3
 Attached as Appendix 3. 
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the statutory languaqe, toqether with the 
necessary implications to be drawn therefrom, but 
places the county commission in the untenable 
position with regard to its ability to enforce its 
own zoning resolution. 
"That the county commission need not invest the 
board of adjustments with the power, to .issue 
special exceptions is clear from the statutory 
languaqe. [T]he board of adjustments is 
constituted by statute a form for review of all 
administrative zoning decisions, but nowhere is it 
made the exclusive repository of appellate 
powers. Should the county commission elect not to 
bestow upon the board of adjustments the power to 
issue special exemptions, but to place such power 
in the planning commission instead, and to reserve 
to itself the final say in the dispensation of 
such exemptions, we cannot say that it has sought 
to clothe itself with authority not granted by the 
legislature." Id. at 445, 446 (emphasis in 
original) . ?,"""••"'... 
From the above, it is clear that the City Council has the 
legislative prerogative of designating the forum(s) it deems 
appropriate, together with any reasonable requirements it 
determines necessary, in providing for the procedural and 
substantive provisions of the City's zoning ordinances. 
B. THERE IS NO LEGAL REQUIREMENT BARRING AN 
APPEAL TO THE CITY COUNCIL. 
Appellant-Scherbel has, further, challenged the validity of 
the ordinance which provides that any appeal from the Planning 
Commission shall go to the City Council. This argument is 
identical to that discussed in Point V, VI and VII, above. 
C. INDIVIDUALS GIVEN NOTICE OF LAND USE ISSUES 
NEED NOT BE PARTIES IN AN APPEAL OF THE "f 
HEARING DECISION WHEN THEY WERE NOT PARTIES 
TO THE ORIGINAL HEARING. 
Appellant-Scherbel has also argued that the appeal procedure 
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established by said ordinance requires that all owners of 
property be joined as parties in the appeal, this statement is 
potentially incorrect. A reading of the statute demonstrates 
that it only requires that notice be given to the property owners 
within a 400-foot radius of the property, for which the owner or 
developer are seeking a conditional use. 
Full compliance with the law was made with this law and 
appellant's position should be summarily rejected. Notice 
requirements do not require them all to be parties in an appeal 
process. Without citation of relevant authority, this "novel" 
theory must be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The City respectfully submits that the trial court's 
judgment was correct. It ruled correctly that appellant had no 
right to a building permit, based upon any one of his four 
projects or sets of schematic drawings. The record more than 
adequately supports the lower court's Findings that appellant's 
actions seeking a building permit fell far short of those 
required by the Supreme Court in Western Equities. These 
deficiencies include: 
1. The schematics violate existing zoning ordinance; 
2. The schematics are not sufficient to identify the 
precise building to be built; 
Section 51-14A-13, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1965, as amended. 
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3. Zoning variances were reauired for all proposed 
projects, which had not been obtained; 
4. No building permit was ever applied for; 
5. A zoning change predates and was the catalyst for 
appellant-Scherbel pursuing his*proposed development. At all r 
times,.-.the zoning change process was under consideration and took 
effect while appellant-Scherbel was still pursuing initial desian 
concepts of his project(s); and 
6. No working drawings existed which identify the precise 
structure to be built or by which the City could determine 
compliance with applicable zoning ordinances and building codes. 
Regardless of whether the City Council properly or 
improperly heard the appeal from the Planning Commission, 
appellant's request for a permit cannot be granted. The 
appellant's failure to do more than submit a myriad of conceptual 
drawings for possible projects, preserves no right under Western 
Equities as discussed above. -*-.
 c 
The City has validly adopted development standards is based 
upon both state law and the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Penn. Central, supra. 
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's request for mandamus 
and other equitable relief should be denied and the actions and 
ordinances of City should be upheld in all respects. 
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DATED this 6th day of December, 1984. 
cclOl 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
JUDY F. LEVER 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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JUDY F. LEVER 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant 
100 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah ;84111 
Telephone: 535-7788 
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IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACK F . SCHERBEL, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s , 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
et al. , 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
C i v i l N o . C 8 0 - 1 3 3 8 
T h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d m a t t e r was h e a r d a t t r i a l on D e c e m b e r -
1 7 , 1 9 8 2 , b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e J u d g e E r n e s t F . B a l d w i n . 
P l a i n t i f f w a s p r e s e n t a n d r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , Mr. H e n r y U 
C h a i , I I
 f and the defendants were represented by Judy F. Lessr 
and Paul G. Maughan, Assistant City Attorney's for Salt LafeSqf 
Corporation. 
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings on file and fe^r 
heard the testimony of witnesses and the evidence presented^ 
t r ia l and the argument of counsel, having heretofore entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
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ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: ~ ^ 
1. The plaintiff's complaint for extraordinary relief is 
hereby dismissed. 
2. The decision of the Salt Lake City Council denying 
conceptual approval to the plaintifffs proposed construction 
project is hereby affirmed. The decision of the Council was not 
arbitrary or capricious, nor did it exceed the authority of the 
City Council. 
3. The terms and provisions contained in Section 51-32-8(3) 
relating to visual compatibility are not unconstitutionally 
vague. 
4. Section 51-14A-1, et seq., Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, pertaining to the creation of residential "R-2H" 
zoning districts is not invalid nor unconstitutional. 
5. The action of the City Council in downzoning the East 
Central Avenues, as described in Ordinance #10 of 1980, to a 
residential nR-2H" classification was not invalid. 
6. The plaintiff is not entitled to an order permitting 
plaintiff to build any of his proposed construction projects, and 
has no vested right to construc^""any such project(s). 
DATED this r/S day o f / — p y> /-<' xi „ , 1983. 
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BY THE COURT^ 
/ 
ERNEST F . BALDWIN, JUDGE 
Daputy CU&K I 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERED 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order to Henry K. Chai, II, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN USD 
MARTINEAU, Attorney for Plaintiff, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventfc 
Floor, P.O. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this /(^ day 
of Jn/^k^L^ 1983. 
.
 y«%.ur^a.*— — — 
i 
/ 
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JUDY F . LEVER 
A s s i s t a n t C i t y A t t o r n e y 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
100 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : 5 3 5 - 7 7 8 8 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JACK F . SCHERBEL, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
e t a l . , 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
SECOND AMENDED 
• FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND COFZLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
C i v i l N o . C 8 0 - 1 3 3 8 
T h i s m a t t e r w a s t r i e d by t h e C o u r t on D e c e i r i e r 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 # 
16 and 1 7 , 1 9 8 2 . T h e p l a i n t i f f was p r e s e n t and r e p r e s e n t e d by • 
c o u n s e l , Mr . H e n r y K . C h a i , I I , SNOW, CHRISTENSEir & MARTINEAU. 
D e f e n d a n t s w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d b y J u d y F . L e v e r and P a u l G. Maughan , 
A s s i s t a n t C i t y A t t o r n e y s . T h e C o u r t h a s c o n s i d e r e d t h e e v i d e n c e , 
t e s t i m o n y a n d a r g u m e n t s o f t h e p a r t i e s and e n t e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g 
F i n d i n g s o f F a c t a n d C o n c l u s i o n s of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I . C o n t r o v e r s y , A p p l i c a t i o n and P r o p e r t y I n t e r e s t s . 
1 . On O c t o b e r 2 4 , 1 9 7 9 , p l a i n t i f f f i l e d w i th S a l t Lake C i t y 
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Corporation ("City") a completed "Application for a Permit to 
Construct a New Building or St ructure Within an His to r ic 
D i s t r i c t " ("Appl icat ion") Exhibit 2-P. This Application form was 
submitted " to the Planning and Zoning Commission ("Commission") 
and to the H i s t o r i c a l Landmark Committee" ("Landmark") under the 
Zoning Ordinance of S a l t Lake Ci ty ." The Application requested 
approval to "bui ld a 35 un i t condominium projec t" on par t of the 
eas t s ide of "E" S t r e e t between F i r s t and Second Avenues. 
Conceptual drawings (Exhibi t 37-P) were submitted with the 
Application form which was known as Case No. 164. 
2. The a p p l i c a t i o n covered four parce l s of property. 
P l a i n t i f f then and a t the time of t r i a l owned three of the four 
pa r ce l s . He did not own the fourth p a r c e l , nor did he have a 
binding agreement to acquire i t . He did have ora l permission of 
•Mi*"-i t s owner to include i t in h i s Applicat ion. 
3. When the Applicat ion was f i l e d , the property was zoned & 
"R-6". *** 
I I . Consolidated Chronology 
4. In 1976r the City enacted the His to r i c D i s t r i c t and 
Landmark S i t e s Ordinances, Section 51-32-1 e t s ea . , Revised 
Ordinances of S a l t Lake City ("Sites Ordinance"). 
5 . Under the S i t e s Ordinance, in 1978 the City established 
the Avenues H i s t o r i c D i s t r i c t . P l a i n t i f f f s property and proposed 
redevelopment i s in the Avenues His tor ic D i s t r i c t . 
6. The p l a i n t i f f and h i s a rch i tec t knew of the design 
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review process required by the S i t e s Ordinance by virtue of each 
independently having e a r l i e r submitted a proposed project tt* 
Landmark for review. 
T. In November of 19 78f some of the property owners aM 
res iden t s of the Avenues and the Greater Avenues Community 
Council ("GACC") began a d r ive to have the City adopt a new lone 
and to "downzone" or change the zoning of the East Central 
Avenues, which included the p l a i n t i f f ' s property, to tore 
r e s t r i c t i v e zones. These changes in zoning were i^^iidEatad with 
the City in January of 19 79 and processed throughout the yesc by 
the various City departments . The proposal was fi led as Petition 
No. 579 of 1979 by the City in Ju ly of tha t year. 
8. In the Spring of 1979r p l a i n t i f f employed Mr. Babcock, 
an a r c h i t e c t , to design a condominium project under the "R-€P 
high density zoning to meet the visual compatibil i ty requirements 
of the s i t e ordinances . At t h a t time, both Mr. Babcock and the 
p l a i n t i f f were aware of tfee=~proposal to downzone the East Ctetral 
Avenues, which included the p l a i n t i f f 1 s property. 
9. On July 5, 1979, said Pe t i t i on 579-79 was filed wiifi the 
City by Kathy Wacker, GACC, e t a l . requesting the creation of an 
MR-2Hn zone c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and the downzoning of the East Central 
p a r t of the Avenues, including p l a i n t i f f f s "E" Street property. 
10. In August of 1979, Babcock informally contacted 
Landmark's chairperson to d i scuss the p l a i n t i f f f s project ad to 
ident ify any poss ib le Landmark concerns for such a project. The 
- 3 -
:<56 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pending zoning changes for the, property were also discussed at 
this time. 
11. On October 11, 1979, the Commission scheduled a public 
hearing to consider the adoption of the proposednR-2Hn district 
and the downzoning for the East Central Avenues requested by 
Petition 579. The hearing on said petition was continued to 
October 25, 1979. Plaintiff attended the informal hearing before 
the Commission. 
12. After the filing of the Application referred to in 
paragraph 1 on October 24, 1979, the Application accompanied by 
conceptual drawings of a 75' high, 35-unit multiple family 
dwelling (Exhibit 37-P) was referred to Landmark for design 
review and a recommendation as to visual compatibility under the 
Sites Ordinance. 
13. On November 8, 1979, the Planning Commission formally 
<£~??J 
recommended _approvaiy-&t P e t i t i o n 579 proposing adoption of the 
*^  j 
nR-2Hn d i s t r i c t and the downzoning of the East Central Avenues, 
isO -»tuo^ 
and it\referred the matter to the City Commission for further 
action; ^ U'&~&&-<o X ^ w ^ z ^ ^ - * -
14. In November and December 1979, plaintiff and Mr. 
Babcock met with Landmark and its architectural subcommittee to 
review the conceptual plan for compliance with the Sites 
Ordinancefs development standards so that they could receive a 
favorable recommendation from Landmarks. During this process 
they made some changes in an attempt to address concerns raised 
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by i t s members. 
15. On December 4, 1979, Landmark, a f t e r negative reco^en-
dat ion from i t s a r c h i t e c t u r a l subcommittee, denied the 
Applicat ion a f t e r determining the proposed 75' high, 35-unit 
p ro jec t violated the development s tandards pertaining to heicfit 
and scale and was not v i s u a l l y compatible with adjacent 
bu i ld ings . 
16. On December 6, 1979, p l a i n t i f f sent a l e t t e r to the 
Commission request ing in e f f ec t , t ha t i t approve the Application 
notwithstanding Landmarkfs adverse recommendation. 
17. On December 13, 1979, the Commission was presented with 
p l a i n t i f f ' s l e t t e r^and h i s o ra l request to reverse Landmark. 
GAAC, supporting Landmark's recommendation, requested an 
opportunity to be heard on the i s sue . The Commission scheduled 
an informal hearing to consider p l a i n t i f f ' s appeal at i t s next 
meeting (January 10, 1980). 
18. In January 1980, the Council-Mayor form of governmsat 
went in to effect in the Ci ty , replacing the Commission form. 
19. In ear ly January of 1980, the City Council advertise! a 
pub l ic hearing to be held January 29, 1980 to consider Petitiaa 
579 requesting the c rea t ion of the "R-2H" d i s t r i c t and downzemng 
of the East Central Avenues a rea . 
20. In prepara t ion for the design review appeal before tte 
Planning Commission, Babcock prepared conceptual sketches for a 
second or revised p ro jec t - 65 ' high with 32 uni ts . These 
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heitiatic changes were subsequently refined and submitted in the 
form of Exhibit 39~P directly to the Planning Commission without 
prior review by Landmark. Finding this revised or second project 
visually compatible with development standards, the Planning 
Commission disagreed with Landmark and conceptually approved it 
after the hearing on January 10, 1980. 
21. On January 11, 1980, GAAC appealed the decision of the 
Planning Commission in a letter addressed to the Mayor. 
22. On January 29, 1980f the Salt Lake City Attorney's 
office provided Mayor Ted Wilson and the City Council with an 
opinion letter regarding the procedure for hearing GAAC's appeal. 
23. On January 29, the hearing on Petition 579 before the 
City Council was continued to January 31, 1980. After the 
hearing the City Council conceptually approved the proposals and 
directed the preparation of formal ordinances. 
24. On February 4, 1980, the City Council notified 
plaintiff's attorney by letter that it would hear GACC's appeal 
of the Planning Commission's design approval given to plaintiff's 
project on February 19, 1980. 
25. On February 5, 1980, Mr. Babcock presented to Landmark 
the second or revised 32-unit project (Exhibit 39-P) approved 
earlier, by the Commission. Landmark found the second or revised 
project to be similarly incompatible for the same reasons 
associated with the original 35 unit project. 
26. On February 19, 1980 Mayor Ted L. Wilson issued 
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Executive Order #2 des igna t ing the City Council to hear GACC's 
appeal . 
27. On February 19, 1980, the City Council in i t s meeting 
passed the ordinances conceptua l ly approved in January creating 
the lfR-2H,f d i s t r i c t and downzoning the Avenues. Both ordinances 
were scheduled for p u b l i c a t i o n on February 26, 1980. 
28. On February 19, 1980, during the City Council meeting, 
the City Council considered GACC's appeal to reverse the Planning 
Commission decis ion and affirm Landmark's recommendation that the 
pro jec t was v i sua l ly incompatible with the h i s t o r i c a l d i s t r i c t on 
i t s chosen s i t e . The City Council heard the arguments of GACC, 
p l a i n t i f f and other i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s , and reviewed the revised 
p lans showing 32 u n i t s t i e r e d to 65' high in Exhibit 39-P 
approved by the Commission. 
29. Consideration on the matter was continued to a City 
Council meeting on February 20, 1980. After a f ie ld t r ip to the 
s i t e and fur ther d e l i b e r a t i o n on the matter , the Council found 
the design concept to be v i s u a l l y incompatible with the 
surrounding s t r u c t u r e s and contrary to the development standards 
applicable in the h i s t o r i c d i s t r i c t . I t voted to reverse the 
decis ion of the Planning Commission and affirmed Landmark's 
recommendation. y 
30. In explaining t h e i r votes , some individual members of 
the City Council urged p l a i n t i f f to work with GACC to find an 
acceptable plan for compatible development on the s i t e . Pursuant 
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to this request, plaintiff authorized Mr. Babcock to explore 
redesigning the project. 
31. On February 25, 1980, plaintiff filed suit and was able 
to temporarily restrain the scheduled publication of the "R-^H" 
and the downzoning ordinances. 
32. On March 3, 1980, plaintiff filed another Application 
with the Planning Department known as Landmark Case No. 190, 
which schematically proposed a third or revised project 42f high 
with 18 units, to be located on two of the fbur original parcels 
of property. 
3 3. The Application for Case No. 190 «as heard by Landmark 
on March 4, 1980 and referred to the architectural 
subcommittee* Said third project together «ith a fourth 
alternative proposing 24 units on three of tte four parcels 
(Exhibit 43-P) were considered by the architectual subcommittee 
prior to the Landmark meeting of March 17, 1580. 
34. On March 11, 1980, the City adopted written findings of 
facts and an order: reversing the Planning Ctenmission, affirming 
Landmark, and denying design review approval based upon the 32 
unit, 65' high plans of Exhibit 39-P. 
35. On March 17, 1980, Landmark considered the 18-unit 42' 
high and the 24 unit alternatives under Case No. 190. Plaintiff 
later abandoned said proposals when the "R-2E* and rezoning 
ordinances became effective. 
36. On March 24, 1980, five months had elapsed since the 
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Application for the 35 u n i t project had been f i l ed . At that time 
and pr ior to March 28, 1980, p l a i n t i f f contacted the City to 
l ea rn if the City would accept working drawings and issie him a 
building permit based on Exhibit 39-P approved by the Commission. 
37. P l a i n t i f f was informed t h a t the Planning Department 
could not give him zoning approval on the schematic drssings. 
(Exhibit 39-P) fo r : (1) the prel iminary plans lacked tie de ta i l 
required to complete a required review for zoning compliance -
excluding h i s t o r i c a l d i s t r i c t cons idera t ions ; and (2) e^n 
assuming arguendo, drawings could be prepared that complied with 
the base zoning of the "R-S" d i s t r i c t , the schematic design had 
been found by the City Council to be contrary to the re t i rements 
of the His tor ic D i s t r i c t . 
38. As of March 24, 1980, no working drawings had been 
prepared for any of the pro jec t s by Mr. Babcock. 
39. After being so informed, p l a i n t i f f did not «fllMftyL Ms 
have working drawings prepared or submit the same to tfa» City. 
40. The ordinance es tab l i sh ing the f,R-2H" d i s t r i c t and 
downzoning pa r t of the Avenues, including p l a i n t i f f ' s property 
were published and took ef fec t on March 28, 1980 af ter the 
r e l ease of the r e s t r a i n i n g order . 
IV. Plan Review a t T r i a l . 
41. A subsequent review of a l l of the schematic or 
conceptual drawings for the various p ro j ec t s and revisions 
(Exhibits 37-P, 38-P, 39-P and 43-P) ^3&=^BBS^b^r^y-^B 
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p±#ttB33x^^ . *Th£ k^view of the proposed 
projects revealed: 
(a) Violations of the then existing "R-G" zoning ordinance 
regarding required sideyards and rearyards, an unresolved 
ownership conflict regarding an existing right of way; and the 
undisclosed lack of ownership of one parcel, 
(b) The necessity of obtaining variances from the Board of 
Adjustment before zoning approval could have been given for any 
of the projects due to setback, sideyards and other violations. 
(c) While the above problems could be detected from the 
preliminary drawings, the drawings submitted for each of the 
proposed or revised projects were insufficient to conduct a 
complete zoning review. 
42. Without regard to the requirements of the Historic 
District related to design review, or to the change in zoning, 
the various projects or revisions proposed did not meet the 
minimum requirements of the "R-6n zoning district and the 
projects could not have been approved by the City even on a 
schematic basis. The drawings for each project were otherwise 
too preliminary and incomplete for full zoning review, and as 
indicated in paragraph 41 above, and such drawings could not be 
used to support zoning approval which is a prerequisite to the 
issuance of a building permit. 
43. Before an application for a building permit could be 
submitted to the Building Department and referred to the Planning 
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pepartment for zoning approval, and then be referred for review 
approval by the remaining departments of the City, working 
drawings would have to have been prepared setting forth detailed 
information, including specifications, etc. for a specific 
proposed project. Said documents would have taken the architect 
(according to his estimate) approximately a minimum of 3 months 
to prepare. 
44. Plaintiff's architect knew the preliminary drawings 
submitted to Landmark and the Commission for design review were 
insufficient to support the application or the issuance of a 
building permit. 
45. No application for a building permit from the City's 
Building Department was ever applied for by the plaintiff. 
46. None of the four or various projects reflected in the 
exhibits proposed by the plaintiff meets the minimum criteria for 
multiple family dwellings under the new "R-2H" zoning ordinance. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The City has the power to zone and to create zoning 
districts in order to promote the health, safety, morals, 
convenience, order, prosperity and welfare of the inhabitants of 
the city. Legitimate objects of the City's power include zoning, 
providing adequate light and air, classifying land uses, and the 
preservation of buildings and structures of historical and 
architectural significance, and the creation of historical 
districts and landmark sites. 
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•^ , -^c of qpction 5 1 - 3 2 - 1 , e t seq. , Revised 2 . The p r o v i s i o n s or o e i n u n ->• ->*< t ^ 
0 ^ i n a n c e s _ o i _ S J 1 ^ ^ 1965, as amended, es tab-
l i s h i n g h i s t o r i c d i s t r i c t s and landmark s i t e s c o n s t i t u t e a va l id 
e x e r c i s e of t h e C i t y ' s power and the prov i s ions of said ordinance 
are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a l i d and enforceable . 
3 . s a i d h i s t o r i c d i s t r i c t ordinance, "Si tes Ordinance-
requires a l l proposa ls for construct ion within a h i s t o r i c 
d i s t r i c t or s i t e to be submitted by appl i ca t ion for design review 
by the H i s t o r i c Landmark Committee, "Landmark". Landmark 
determines whether the proposed project i s v i s u a l l y compatible 
with e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s and adjacent bui ld ings based upon 
development standards adopted by the Ci ty . Landmark's dec i s ion 
i s forwarded as a recommendation to the Planning Commission. The 
Planning Commission then evaluates the proposal in l ight of 
Landmark's recommendation and e i ther denies or grants conceptual 
approval to the des ign of the proposal . Unless t imely appealed 
the Planning Commission's dec i s ion i s f i n a l . I f approved, the 
proposed p r o j e c t i s then processed l ike a l l other construction 
p r o j e c t s . A separa te appl i ca t ion for a building permit 
accompanied by working drawings must be submitted to the Building 
apar tment i n order to determine whether the project « . t s zoning 
ordinances and bui ld ing code requirements. 
4 s p e c i f i c a l l y . Sec t ion 53-32-8 , Revised^rdinances_of 
S ^ l ^ ^ i t y ^ J J t a h , , 965 , as amended, pertaining to development 
standards i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . The term "visual ly compatib le" as 
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used within said section is not unconstitutionally vague. 
5. The provisions of Section 51-14A-1, et seq., Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake Cityy Utah, 19 65, as amended, creating an 
"R-2H" zoning district, constitute a valid exercise of the zoning 
power of Salt Lake City Corporation. 
6. The provisions of the "R-2H" ordinance pertaining to 
both the procedure for obtaining a conditional use in said 
district, and the functions of the Landmark Committee and the 
Board of Adjustment as set forth in Sections 51-14A-10, 11 and 13 
are valid and constitutional. 
7. The City Council of Salt Lake City is the legislative 
body of Salt Lake City. The Planning and Z6ning Commission is a 
subordinate and an advisory body to the City Council. Decisions 
rendered by the Planning and Zoning Commission are reviewable by 
the City Council.
 :L 
8. The Greater Avenues Community Council "GACC" constituted 
a "person aggrieved"rby the Planning Commissionfs decision 
approving the design of plaintiff's project and had the rigfct to 
appeal the decision to the City Council. The fact that the term 
"Board of Commissioners" is found in Section 51-31-11, and that 
the Commission form of government in Salt Lake City has been 
replaced by a Council/Mayor form of government does not render 
the provisions of said ordinance invalid. 
9. The City Council was a proper body to hear the appeal 
from the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission regarding 
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t he proposed design of p l a i n t i f f ' s project withfn an h i s t o r i c 
d i s t r i c t , based upon both i t s inherent powers aad the delegation 
of such power by the Mayor. 
10. The hear ing and decis ion of the Council did not v i o l a t e 
the separat ion of powers doc t r ine as set forth in the Optional 
Forms of Government Act, Sect ion 10-3-1201, et seq.
 f Utah Code 
Ann. The decis ion of the Council denying design approval t o 
p l a i n t i f f ' s p ro j ec t was wi th in the scope and po¥er of the Council 
and was not a r b i t r a r y or c a p r i c i o u s . 
11 . GACC was provided an appropria te admimistrative forum 
by the City regarding the appeal . 
(12. The p l a i n t i f f has no vested r i g h t , ani i s not en t i t l ed 
to an order, pe rmi t t ing the p l a i n t i f f to build tfie proposed 
const ruct ion p ro jec t involving 32-35 un i t s of 6 s to r i e s or 65-751 
in he igh t . The a c t i o n s of the p l a i n t i f f in subsitting only' 
schematic and pre l iminary drawings tha t fai led sren to s a t i s i f y 
basic requirements for design approval at a tin® when a change of 
zoning was pending before the City for the area in which 
p l a i n t i f f ' s proposed p ro jec t was located , did not c o n s t i t u t e 
subs t an t i a l compliance with the ordinances of Salt Lake City or 
the laws of t h i s s t a t e , s u f f i c i e n t to vest plaintiff with the 
j r ight for a bui ld ing permi t . 
13. P l a i n t i f f ' s proposed preliminary conc^tual and 
schematic drawings were incomplete, demonstrated v io la t ions of 
ex i s t ing zoning o rd inances , and would have required zoning 
. . * . . ' . . " . • 
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variances from the Board of Adjustment or changes. Said projects 
would have required both additional schematic and working 
drawings and changes before a building permit for plaintiff's 
project could have either been applied for or issued by the 
City. Thereforef the plaintiff's actions did not constitute 
sufficient compliance with the ordinances of Salt Lake City or 
the laws of this state in order to vest the plaintiff the right 
to build any one of the proposed construction projects. 
14. That passage of five months after plaintiff submitted 
his initial proposed project for design review did not require 
the City to issue a building permit to the plaintiff pursuant to 
the provisions of 51-37-7 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City; 
and did not vest the plaintiff the right to build his first 
proposed 35 unit project or any other subsequently proposed 
project or revision in that: The ordinance in effect at all 
relevant times of this matter, required the City to issue a ~ 
building permit after the expiration of 5 months, only if the 
proposed project "met all other requirements of City and State 
law for issuance of such a [building] permit." Plaintiff's 
projects did not meet all requirements for the issuance of a 
building permit. 
15. The submission of an application for design review by 
the Landmark Committee does not constitute the submission of an 
application for a building permit. 
16. The action of the City Council in downzoning the East 
~
1 5
~ ^ 
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Central Avenues, as described in Ordinance #10 of 1980, to a 
residential "R~2H" classification on an area including 
plaintiff's property was valid. 
17. Salt Lake City did not have a compelling reason for 
exercising its police power retroactively, had the plaintiff been 
found entitled to proceed under the "R-6" zoning. 
18. Plaintiff's prayer for extraordinary relief should be 
denied, and plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this day of £^~&&c-
fs / 
TTEST 
DIXON H 
Deputy Clsrk 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the 
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